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COMMENT 
CALIFORNIA'S MOVE-AWAY LAW: 
ARE CHILDREN BEING HURT BY 
JUDICIAL PRESUMPTIONS THAT 
SWEEP TOO BROADLY? 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Courts often modify child custody1 orders when a parent 
with custody of the children desires to relocate with the chil-
dren.2 When and how to modify initial custody orders when 
one parent relocates is currently the most hotly debated issue 
in California's family law courts.3 The growing number of 
these cases4 is largely due to the continuing rise in the divorce 
rate coupled with an increasingly mobile society.s Further, 
economic needs often require that a parent change residence 
during the children's minority.6 In its struggle to create a 
1. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 385 (6th ed. 1990). "Custody of children" refers 
to the "care, control and maintenance of a child which may be awarded by a court to 
one of the parents as in a divorce or separation proceeding." Id. 
2. See Judith S. Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psycho-
logical and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 
FAM. L.Q. 305 (1996). 
3. Telephone Interview with Sharon Lazaneo and Jackie Karkazis, Family Law 
Mediation and Evaluation Specialists, in Oakland, Cal. (Aug. 24, 1997). 
4. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, Family Lawyer, Nachlis & Fink, in San Fran-
cisco, Cal. (Jul. 8, 1997). 
5. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Ber-
keley, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997). Judge Duncan points out that working parents are neces-
sarily more mobile today, due in part to the rising frequency of corporate transfers. He 
has litigated several move-away cases involving this circumstance. Id. 
6. See In re Marriage of Selzer, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 829 (Ct. App. 1994). See 
also Lorie S. N achlis, Overview of Move-Away Law and Policy, 19 FAMILY LAw NEWS 2, 
527 
1
Gould: California's Move-Away Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1998
528 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vo1.28:527 
standard for custody modifications in these "move-away" 
cases,7 the California judiciary has established judicial pre-
sumptions to determine whether to modify the initial custody 
order.8 
Critics of current "move-away" laws contend that these pre-
sumptions are overbroad and, therefore, exclude consideration 
of factors essential to a thorough analysis of what is best for 
the children involved.9 These critics argue that move-away 
cases are too fact-specific and sensitive for a mechanical appli-
cation of sweeping legal presumptions.10 Factors such as chil-
dren's ages, quality of the relationship with the non-moving 
parent, and attachment to the community vary widely among 
families. 11 
This Comment will summarize the various types of custody 
situations and their relevance in deciding move-away cases.12 
Next, this Comment will examine In re Marriage of Burgess,13 
a landmark California Supreme Court move-away case, and 
discuss its impact on family law courts, families, and attorneys 
1 (1996) [hereinafter "Nachlis"). One American in five changes his or her residence 
each year, most often for economic reasons. Other reasons include remarriage, and 
closer proximity to extended family. Id. 
7. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Whealon, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Courts typically refer to cases involving a parent's desire to relocate with the children 
as "move-away" cases. Id. See also Michele A. Katz, Tropea v. Tropea, Tropea and its 
Recent Aftermath: Relocation Cases Decided After Tropea, 177 PLUCRIM 59 (1997). In 
move-away cases, "the interests of a custodial parent who wishes to move away are 
pitted against those of a noncustodial parent who has a powerful desire to maintain 
frequent and regular contact with the children." Id. at 62. See infra notes 61-88 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the standard used for deciding move-away cases. 
8. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). The primary pre-
sumption from Burgess is that a custodial parent may move with the children absent a 
showing of detriment to the child caused by the move, because preserving the custodial 
relationship is paramount. Id. at 478. 
9. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, supra note 4; Telephone Interview with Mar-
garet Lee, Clinical Psychologist, in San Francisco, CA (Aug. 19, 1997). 
10. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, supra note 4; Telephone Interview with Mar-
garet Lee, supra note 9. 
11. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, supra note 4. 
12. See infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the different 
custody situations. 
13. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). See infra notes 54-88 
and accompanying text for a summary of Burgess. 
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involved with move-away cases.14 Included is an examination 
of certain factors that the Burgess court did not fully address in 
its analysis.15 Finally, drawing upon public policy, social sci-
ence research, legal commentary, and other jurisdictions' move-
away laws,16 this Comment will propose a more comprehensive 
approach to deciding move-away casesP This approach limits 
the application of judicial presumptions, and allows for greater 
consideration of the specific facts of each case, especially 
through recharacterizing the types of parent-child relation-
ships that develop after the parents separate.18 
II. BACKGROUND 
The "custodial parent" is the parent declared in the custody 
order to be the parent with whom the children primarily re-
side.l9 The "noncustodial parent" is the parent declared in the 
custody order as having a lesser amount of time with the chil-
dren.2o When a custodial parent gives notice to the noncusto-
dial parent of a planned move with the children, the noncusto-
dial parent may petition the court to prohibit the move,· or to 
change the initial custody order if the custodial parent does 
move.21 Whether a court will permit a parent to relocate with 
the children generally depends on the type of custody arrange-
14. See infra notes 203-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of Burgess's im-
pact. 
15. See infra notes 89-223 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factors 
that the Burgess court did not fully address. 
16. See infra notes 89-257 and accompanying text for a discussion of these sources 
and what they expound. 
17. See infra notes 258-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of a proposed 
approach to deciding move-away cases that is broader than Burgess's. 
18. See infra notes 264-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of proposed 
classifications of child custody. 
19. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 385 (6th ed. 1990). Additionally, "custody" re-
fers to the "care, control, and maintenance of a child which may be awarded by the 
court to one of the parents as in a divorce or separation proceeding." Id. See infra 
notes 25-31 and accompanying text for further discussion of custodial parents. 
20. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Ber-
keley, Cal. (Dec. 19, 1997). 
21. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rice, No. D94-00144 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 31, 
1997). 
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ment currently in place.22 Courts examine whether the par-
ents share joint custody or a less balanced custody situation.23 
The type of custody the parents share generally determines the 
standard of review the courts will use to decide whether to 
permit a relocation.24 
A. TYPES OF CUSTODY ARRANGEMENTS 
California law recognizes two general classifications of 
physical custody: "joint physical custody" and "sole physical 
custody.»25 Under California Family Code section 3400, par-
ents who share "joint physical custody" are each expected to 
spend substantial time with the children.26 However, how 
equal the time share must be to be treated as joint physical 
custody remains unclear.27 Many parents who co-parent under 
the label of "joint physical custody" actually carry out a some-
what unbalanced time share in which one parent has primary 
physical custody and the other has liberal visitation rights.28 
The parent with "primary physical custody" has more responsi-
bility for the children, and is generally the parent who provides 
the children's main residence.29 
California Family Code section 3007 states that a parent 
with "sole physical custody" has custody of the children; the 
22. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of how move-
away cases should be evaluated based on the type of custody in place, as set forth by In 
re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). 
23. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text regarding how courts determine 
whether or not the parties have joint custody. 
24. See Richard M. Bryan, Beyond Burgess: One Year Later, 20 FAM. ADvOC. 14, 
15-16 (1997). 
25. See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text for defmitions of "joint physical 
custody" and "sole physical custody." 
26. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3004 (West 1994). Section 3004 specifically defmes 
joint physical custody as the situation in which "each of the parents [has] significant 
periods of physical custody." This section adds, "Joint physical custody shall be shared 
by the parents in such a way so as to assure a child of frequent and continuing contact 
with both parents." Id. 
27. See M. SUE TALIA, How TO AVOID THE DIVORCE FROM HELL 257-258 (Nexus 
Publishing Company 1997) (1996). 
28. See id. 
29. See infra notes 39, 273-275, and accompanying text, for further discussion of 
"primary physical custody." 
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other parent has only visitation rights.3o Thus, an order for 
"sole physical custody" assigns a more unbalanced time share 
than does a "joint physical custody" order.31 
B. THE INITIAL CUSTODY DETERMINATION 
1. The "Best Interest of the Child" Standard 
If parents do not stipulate to an initial custody arrange-
ment,32 California courts apply the "best interest of the child" 
standard in making the initial custody determination.33 Under 
this standard, divorce should minimally alter the environment 
in which children can grow into healthy, mature and educated 
adults.34 California Family Code section 3011 specifically re-
quires that the court strive to protect the contact the child has 
with both parents.35 
2. The Judicial Preference for Maternal Custody Awards 
California custody law has historically reflected the tradi-
tional societal view of mothers as the children's gender-
appropriate domestic caretaker, and fathers as the working 
provider.36 Although California statutes no longer explicitly 
30. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3007 (West 1994). Section 3007 specifically states that 
"a child shall reside with and be under the supervision of one parent, subject to the 
power of the court to order visitation." Id. See also Martin F. Triano & Kristine Fowler 
Cirby, Move Away Cases, 1 FAM. L. NEWS (Law Offices of Martin F. Triano, San Fran-
cisco, Cal.), Oct. 1997, at 1. 
31. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 3004 with CAL. FAM. CODE § 3007. 
32. See Bourne v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 497 P.2d 110, 114 
(Kan., 1972). A stipulation in this sense is an agreement made in a judicial proceeding 
by the parties or their attorneys. See id. 
33. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 1994 & Supp. 199B). 
34. See Robert Stephan Cohen & Pamela Sicher, 'Tropea' and 'Browner': The Miss-
ing Evidence, 216 N.Y. L.J. 25, S5 (1996). 
35. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 1994). Section 3011 states, "In making a de-
termination of the best interest of the child in a [custody) proceeding ... the court 
shall, among any other factors it fmds relevant, consider ... [t)he nature and amount 
of contact with both parents." Id. See generally Cohen & Sicher, supra note 34 (empha-
sizing the value of preserving the children's contact with both parents after divorce). 
36. See generally Jennifer E. Horne, Note, The Brady Bunch and Other Fictions: 
How Courts Decide Child Custody Disputes Involving Remarried Parents, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 2073 (July 1993) (examining judicial discretion used to resolve child custody dis-
putes involving remarried parents, and in particular, detailing judges' gender stereo-
typing). See also Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender and Justice: Florida and the Nation, 42 
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incorporate gender stereotypes,37 actual custodial outcomes 
still reflect gender biases.38 That is, courts subscribing to these 
stereotypes generally award sole or primary physical custody to 
the mother and visitation rights to the father.39 This tendency 
is based largely on the status of the children's relationship with 
each parent.40 Courts tend to award custody to the parent who 
spends the most time with the children, who is usually the 
mother.41 Moreover, the mother is still frequently perceived by 
the courts as the parent who is better attuned to caring for 
children.42 Meanwhile, since the father still tends to provide 
FLA. L. REV. 181 (1990). Ms. Schafran reviewed various task force reports on gender 
bias in the courts and found "widespread bias against fathers on the part of some 
judges who do not perceive men as being capable or appropriate primary caretakers." 
Id. at 191. 
37. See In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 38 (Cal. 1979). In the Carney 
opinion Justice Mosk wrote, "[Slince it was amended in 1972 the [California Family 
Clode no longer requires or permits the trial courts to favor the mother in determining 
proper custody of a child' of tender years.'" Id. 
38. Interview with Kristi Cotton-Spence, Family Lawyer, Berra-Spence, in San 
Mateo, Cal. (Aug. 21, 1997). Ms. Cotten-Spence opines that in In re Marriage of Bur-
gess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996), the California Supreme Court saw the parents in 
stereotypical terms, casting the mother as the more domestic, caretaking parent and 
the father as appropriately less involved due to his work obligations. The Burgess 
court's perception is unrealistic in modem society where typically both parents have 
jobs outside the home. See id. See also Amicus Curiae Brief of Richard M. Bryan at 26, 
In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996) (No. 5046116). Richard Bryan 
wrote that in Nellis v. Renwick, No. A070565 (Cal. Ct. App. med Aug. 9, 1996), "the 
trial court's decision reflects the judge's apparent view that mothers are more capable 
of providing day time child care than fathers." Id. 
39. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKlN, DMDING THE CHILD: 
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 114 (Harvard University Press 1992). The 
fmdings of the authors' study revealed that: 
[Wlhen children are residing with the mother at the time of separation, 
the father rarely succeeds in defeating her request for sole mother cus-
tody. When the children are living with the father, on the other hand, 
although the father's chances improve significantly, they are not as 
high. In those cases where there is dual residence at the time of sepa-
ration, the father's chances of securing his requested custodial ar-
rangement are not as high as the mother's, but are better than where 
there is mother residence. 
Id. at 105. 
40. See id. at 268. 
41. See id. at 105-06. 
42. See Ross A. Thompson, The Role of the Father After Divorce, 4 THE FUTuRE OF 
CHILDREN 210 (1994). The author writes: 
If many judges believe . . . that children properly belong in maternal 
care-especially during their early years-the "best interests" standard 
provides the flexibility necessary to justify such a decision, regardless 
of the meaning to the child of the relationships she or he shares with 
each parent. Indeed, the preeminence of maternal custody awards 
could reflect, in part, the continuing influence of the "tender years doc-
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more economic support to the children than the mother, he of-
ten spends less time with his children to meet work require-
ments.43 Thus, the capacity of fathers for a meaningful post-
divorce caregiving role is undermined by their pre-divorce eco-
nomic support responsibility.44 
Due to the judicial preference for maternal custody awards, 
fathers are often discouraged from pursuing custody arrange-
ments which allow them a more vital role in their children's 
lives after divorce.45 Consequently, divorce hurts children be-
cause of the loss of time, assistance, and affection provided by 
the noncustodial father.46 Experts believe that children's com-
promised relationship with their noncustodial father results in 
lower levels of social and scholastic adjustment for these chil-
dren as compared with children from families in which the par-
ents remain together.47 Children who lose closeness with their 
father in the aftermath of a divorce struggle more in their peer 
relationships and often suffer a loss of motivation in schoo1.48 
trine" in the minds of many judges and their belief that mothers are 
better suited than fathers for the care of the children. 
[d. at 216-17. 
See also Horne, supra note 36. In the author's survey of cases, findings re-
vealed that: 
Many courts considered fathers favorably if they could point to a person - generally 
a woman - who was willing to help care for their children. In eight cases this person 
was the father's new wife; in seven others it was another female family member, 
usually his mother. Some courts also suggested that single fathers' efforts were 
nothing short of extraordinary, even when they had a female caretaker to assist 
them. 
[d. at 2133. 
43. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 39, at 268. 
44. See Thompson, supra note 42, at 218-19. 
45. See id. at 210,217. 
46. See Paul R. Amato, Life·Span Adjustment of Children to Their Parents' Di· 
vorce, 4 THE FuTURE OF CHILDREN 143, 150 (1994). 
47. See id. 
48. See Robert D. Hess & Kathleen A Cameram, Post-Divorce Family Relation-
ships as Mediating Factors in the Consequences of Divorce for Children, 35 J. Soc. 
ISSUES 79,92-95 (1979). The authors found that children who maintained close positive 
relationships with both parents demonstrated less stress and functioned more effec-
tively in work and social relationships with their peers. See id. See also Michael Rut-
ter, Parent-Child Separation: Psychological Effects on the Children, 12 J. CHILD 
PSYCHOL. AND PSYCHIATRY 233 (1971). Studies show that there is an increase in delin-
quency and antisocial behavior when the father is absent. The delinquency is much 
more pronounced when the father is absent due to separation or divorce rather than 
death. See id. at 241-42. 
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C. JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS IN MOVE-AWAY CASES BASED ON 
THE PARENTS' CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT 
In California's move-away cases involving parents with 
court-ordered "joint physical custody," the children's need for 
continuity and stability often leads to the judicial determina-
tion that preserving the custody status quo is in the children's 
best interest.49 Consequently, a request to move with the chil-
dren made by a parent with joint physical custody may be de-
nied.5o The parent can still relocate, but will risk losing cus-
tody by relocating.51 By contrast, when one parent has "sole 
physical custody" and the noncustodial parent has visitation 
rights, California courts rely heavily on Family Code section 
750152 and permit the sole custodial parent to relocate with the 
children unless the move would cause the children significant 
harm.53 
D. IN RE MARRIAGE OF BURGESS REFINES CALIFORNIA'S MOVE-
AWAY LAw 
In 1996, the California Supreme Court addressed the issue 
of move-aways in deciding In re Marriage of Burgess,54 and 
thereby established a precedent for subsequent California 
move-away cases.55 In Burgess, the mother had sole physical 
custody of the children, and the father followed a detailed 
weekly visitation schedule, as well as an alternative schedule 
49. See In re Marriage of Wheal on, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 565 (Ct. App. 1997). See 
also Brody v. Kroll, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1996). 
50. See, e.g., Cassady v. Signorelli, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 545, 546 (Ct. App. 1996). 
51. See Brody, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282. 
52. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7501(West 1994). Section 7501 states, "A parent enti-
tled to the custody of a child has a right to change the residence of the child, subject to 
the power of the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the rights or welfare 
of the child." Id. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, 
in Berkeley, Cal. (Dec. 19, 1997). Section 7501 was a relatively unknown section before 
the Burgess court used it in making its ruling. Id. See infra notes 54-88, 203-223, and 
accompanying text,regarding In re Marriage of Burgess and its impact. 
53. See infra notes 77-87 and accompanying text regarding how California courts 
identify a move that would significantly harm the children. 
54. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (1996). 
55. See, e.g., Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766 (1997); In re Marriage of 
Whealon, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559 (Ct. App. 1997); Cassady v. Signorelli, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
545 (Ct. App. 1996); Brody v. Kroll, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1996). 
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for biweekly weekend visitation which was dependent on his 
work schedule.56 The mother desired to move from Tehachapi, 
California to Lancaster, California, a distance of forty miles, for 
career advancement and greater access for the children to 
medical and school facilities.57 The father petitioned the court 
to award him primary custody, testifying that the relocation 
would inhibit his ability to maintain his current visitation 
schedule.58 The court permitted the mother to move with the 
children, reasoning that preserving the children's relationship 
with the mother outweighed preventing any resulting diminu-
tion of contact between the children and the noncustodial fa-
ther.59 A general rule emerged from Burgess that when the 
parents do not share joint physical custody, the custodial par-
ent may move with the children unless the move is motivated 
by bad faith, such as to curtail the noncustodial parent's access 
to the children.6o 
Prior to Burgess, '~oint physical custody" meant that each 
parent spent substantial time with the children.61 The Burgess 
court narrowed the definition of "joint physical custody" to es-
tablish the standard of judicial review in move-away cases.62 
The court dermed the term to mean sharing joint physical cus-
tody as mandated by court order and maintaining a roughly 
equal time share arrangement with the children.63 Specifi-
56. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 477. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
59. See id. See also infra notes 67, 93-99, and accompanying text for further dis-
cussion of the weight the Burgess court placed on preserving the custodial relationship. 
60. See infra notes 67-88 and accompanying text for further discussion of Bur· 
gess's general rule. 
6!' See supra note 26 and accompanying text for a statutory deflnition of "joint 
physical custody." See also In re Marriage of Hoover, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 737 (Ct. App. 
1995). In Hoover, the court stated, "[WJhat is before us is a joint physical custody 
situation where both parents have been actively involved since birth in rearing and 
caring for their child. True, mother has had more custodial time, but this is a matter of 
degree only." Id. at 742. 
62. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 483 n. 12. 
63. See id. See, e.g., Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766 n. 2 (Ct. App. 1997). In 
Ruisi, the parents shared physical custody both by court order and as a factual matter. 
The father was awarded care of the child on Sunday, Monday and Tuesday; the mother 
took care of the child on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday; and the parents alternated 
care on Saturday, holidays and vacations. Thus, the parents had "joint physical cus-
todY" as dermed by Burgess. See id. 
9
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cally, in footnote twelve of Justice Stanley Mosk's majority 
opinion, he stated: 
A different analysis may be required when parents 
share joint physical custody of the minor children under 
an existing order and in fact, and one parent seeks to 
relocate with the minor children. In such cases, the cus-
tody order 'may be modified or terminated upon the pe-
tition of one or both parents or on the court's own mo-
tion if it is shown that the best interest of the child re-
quires modification or termination of the order.' The 
trial court must determine de novo what arrangement 
for primary custody is in the best interest of the minor 
children.64 
By implication, Burgess holds that joint physical custody does 
not exist where the actual arrangement between the parents 
approximates equal time with the children despite a court or-
der for an unequal time share.65 Similarly, joint physical cus-
tody does not exist under Burgess where the parents share 
joint physical custody by court order but not as a factual mat-
ter.66 
E. THE REBUTI'ABLE BURGESS PRESUMPTION 
In ruling that a parent with sole physical custody has a 
right to move with the children, the Burgess court relied on the 
rebuttable presumption that protecting the children's relation-
ship with the custodial parent serves the children's best inter-
est.67 A noncustodial parent may rebut that presumption and 
64. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 483 n. 12 (second emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
See also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, 721 (6th ed. 1990). "A de novo review involves 
trying a matter anew the same as if it had not be heard before and as if no decision had 
been previously rendered." Id. 
65 See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 483 n. 12. 
66. See id. 
67. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). Justice Mosk stated: 
"As we have repeatedly emphasized, the paramount need for continuity and stability in 
custody arrangements-and the harm that may result from disruption of established 
patterns of care and emotional bonds with the primary caretaker-weigh heavily in 
favor of maintaining ongoing custody arrangements." Id. at 478-479 (citing In re Mar-
riage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36,38 (Cal. 1979); Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 493 (Cal. 
1986». 
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prevent the move only by demonstrating a change of circum-
stances that warrants an expedient or imperative custody 
change to the noncustodial parent.68 A "change of circum-
stances" is a change relevant to the capacity of the moving 
party or custodial parent to properly care for the child.69 The 
"change" must not have been contemplated at the time of the 
original custody order.70 In addition, the change must enhance 
or adversely impact the welfare of the child.71 To demonstrate 
the requisite changed circumstances, the noncustodial parent 
must present evidence of significant changes since the initial 
custody order. 72 
Prior to Burgess, California courts traditionally did not ap-
ply the term "detriment" to custody proceedings between two 
68. See Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986). In this case, the California 
Supreme Court explained the change of circumstances requirement in the following 
manner: 
In deciding between competing parental claims to custody, the court 
must make an award 'according to the best interests of the child' ... 
The changed circumstances rule is not a different test, devised to sup-
plant the statutory test, but an adjunct to the best-interest test. It pro-
vides, in essence, that once it has been established that a particular 
custodial arrangement is in the best interests of the child, the court ... 
should preserve the established mode of custody unless some significant 
change in circumstances indicates that a different arrangement would 
be in the child's best interest. The rule thus fosters the dual goals of 
judicial economy and protecting stable custody arrangements. 
Id. at 488 (citations omitted). 
See also Carney, 598 P.2d at 38. Justice Mosk wrote in the dictum of the 
Carney opinion: 
It is settled that to justify ordering a change in custody there must gen-
erally be a persuasive showing of changed circumstances affecting the 
child .... The reasons for the rule are clear: 'It is well established that 
the courts are reluctant to order a change of custody and will not do so 
except for imperative reasons; that it is desirable that there be an end 
of litigation and undesirable to change the child's established mode of 
living' (citation omitted). 
Id. 
69. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 231 (6th ed. 1990). 
70. See id. 
71. See id. 
72. See Buchard, 724 P.2d at 490 n. 5. Justice Broussard held that: 
[T)he duration between a prior custody determination and a later trial 
is immaterial to the application of the changed-circumstances rule. 
Once it has been determined that a particular custody serves the child's 
best interests, a party seeking to change custody must show a change in 
circumstances, whether he brings his action two weeks after the deter-
mination or ten years later. 
Id. 
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parents.73 Rather, the courts generally invoked the detriment 
standard in custody litigation involving a child and a non-
parent third party, such as a grandparent.74 Pre-Burgess 
courts defmed "detriment" as an expected net harm to the 
child, after weighing all relevant factors.75 Such harm may 
result from the loss of a parent-child relationship.76 
The Burgess court attached a somewhat different meaning 
to "detriment" when applied to a move-away situation.77 In 
determining what constitutes "detriment" in a move-away, the 
court referred to California Family Code section 7501 which 
prohibits "prejudice to the rights or welfare of the child. "78 The 
detriment must render it "essential or expedient for the welfare 
of the child that there be a change [of custody]."79 Under Bur-
gess, a "change of circumstances" results in "detriment" to the 
child.8o A proposed move in itself is not sufficient to demon-
73. Interview with Bernard N. Wolf, Family Lawyer, Law Offices of Bernard N. 
Wolf, in San Francisco, Cal. (Jul. 21, 1997). 
74. See, e.g., In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1974). 
75. See, e.g., In re Marquis D., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198 (Ct. App. 1995); Armando L. v. 
Super. Ct. ofL.A. County, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222 (Ct. App. 1995); In re Monica C., 36 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 910 (Ct. App. 1995); Cody W. v. Jill V., 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 848, 852 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
76. See, e.g., Guardianship of Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Ct. App. 1983). The 
court in Phillip B. stated, ·Our law recognizes that children generally will sustain 
serious emotional harm when deprived of the emotional benefits flowing from a true 
parent-child relationship." Id. at 791. 
77. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473,482 (Cal. 1996). The court held 
that the custodial parent may move with the children unless the move would infringe 
upon the rights or welfare of the children. See id. at 476. It further held that the re-
duction in the father's visitation time that would necessarily follow from the move did 
not constitute such an infringement. See id. at 484. See supra notes 59-66 and accom-
panying text for a more detailed discussion of the Burgess holding. 
78. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7501 (West 1994). See supra note 52 for the complete 
text of section 7501. 
79. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 482, citing In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 38 
(Cal. 1979). 
80. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). Justice Mosk stated 
that the court should: 
preserve the established mode of custody unless some significant 
change in circumstances indicates that a different arrangement would 
be in the child's best interests ... In a 'move-away' case, a change of 
custody is not justified simply because the custodial parent has chosen, 
for any sound good faith reason, to reside in a different location, but 
only if, as a result of relocation with that parent, the child will suffer 
detriment rendering it 'essential or expedient for the welfare of the 
child that there be a change.' 
Id. at 482. 
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strate the change in circumstances necessary to rebut the pre-
sumption favoring preservation of the custodial relationship.81 
Since Burgess, the legal use of the term "detriment" remains 
problematically vague in the context of move-aways.82 Legal 
experts suggest that detriment refers to a long-term adverse 
effect that transcends the normal adjustment period of a 
move.83 Because this effect is difficult to predict, courts exer-
cise wide discretion in determining the existence of a change of 
circumstances that constitutes detriment.84 
If the noncustodial parent proves that the motive for the 
move is to intentionally disrupt visitation between that parent 
and the child,85 a court may recognize detriment and modify 
custody, despite the Burgess presumptIon favoring preserva-
tion of the custodial relationship.86 Absent such a showing, 
however, a move's mere adverse impact on visitation rights 
generally is not a change in circumstances sufficient to defeat 
the Burgess presumption, because it is not expected to result in 
detriment to the children.87 The move may result in a modifi-
81. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). 
82. Interview with Tony J. Tanke, Partner, Tanke & Willemsen, LLP, in Palo Alto, 
Cal. (Aug. 24, 1997). 
83. See Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Breaking Up a Family or Putting It Back Together 
Again: Refining the Preference in Favor of the Parent in Third-Party Custody Cases, 37 
WM. & MARy L. REV. 1045, 1123 (1996). 
84. Interview with Tony J. Tanke, supra note 82. 
85. See Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434 (Pa. 1990). The Gruber court held that a 
motive of vindictiveness may constitute detriment. It stated: 
The court must assure itself that the move is not motivated by a desire 
to frustrate the visitation rights of the non-custodial parent or to im-
pede the development of a healthy, loving relationship between the 
child and the non-custodial parent. An aspect of this determination is 
the degree to which the court can be confident that the custodial spouse 
will comply cooperatively with alternate visitation arrangements which 
the move may necessitate. 
Id. at 439. 
86. See, e.g., Cassady v. Signorelli, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 545, 547 (Ct. App. 1996). 
87. See Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 13-14, 17, In re Marriage of Rice, 
No. D94-00144 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 31, 1997). Simons, J. stated in his decision: 
[Tlhere is certainly language in Burgess that would suggest that once I 
designated the mother as custodial parent, then I am to say father must 
prove positive detriment or necessity in order to get me to deny 
mother's motion .... And if there is no significant change in circum-
stances ... there is no need to show positive detriment .... I don't be-
lieve there has been a showing of a significant change of circumstances 
13
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cation of the noncustodial parent's visitation rights, but gener-
ally not a shift in custody from one parent to the other.88 
III. DISCUSSION 
The Burgess decision is tailored to the specific facts of that 
case.89 Additionally, the Burgess court relied heavily on cer-
tain expert opinion without fully considering contrary opin-
ion.90 As a result, the Burgess rules have been inappropriately 
applied to cases with widely different custody situations and 
relocation circumstances.91 Such a mechanical application of 
.... [Flrom a legal standpoint the reduction in [the father'sl involve-
ment is not significant. 
Id. 
See also In Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. 1996). Tennessee's move-away 
law resembles that of California. In Aaby, the leading move-away case in Tennessee, 
the noncustodial father presented expert mental health testimony that a move-away 
would be detrimental to the child. Nevertheless, the court held that the move-away did 
not establish an injury that was specific and serious enough to justify the drastic 
measure of changing custody, because preservation of the nature of the relationship 
between the child and custodial parent was paramount. See id. at 630. 
88. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). Justice Mosk wrote: 
Even if 'prejudice' is not established and a change in custody is not' es-
sential for the welfare of the child,' however, the trial court has broad 
discretion to modify orders concerning contact and visitation to mini-
mize the minor children's loss of contact and visitation with the noncus-
todial parent in the event of a move .... 
Id. at 484 (citation omitted). 
See also MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 39, at 295. The authors call at-
tention to the consideration that: 
it becomes important to know how much contact with non-residential 
parents is needed for those parents to sustain a close, committed rela-
tionship with their children. Is a month in the summer, plus a Christ-
mas holiday, enough? If so, long-distance moves are not as threatening 
to a non-custodial parent as they otherwise would be. We do not yet 
know the answer to the question of how much difference the frequency 
of contact makes .... 
Id. 
89. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). 
90. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, Family Lawyer, Nachlis & Fink, in San Fran-
cisco, Cal. (Jul. 8, 1997). 
91. Telephone Interview with Susan Talia, Family Lawyer, Law Offices of Susan 
Talia, in San Francisco, Cal. (Sept. 18, 1997). See Richard M. Bryan, Beyond Burgess: 
One Year Later, 20 FAM. ADvOC. 14, 15-16 (1997) [hereinafter "Bryan"]. Mr. Bryan 
noted, "The distance involved in Burgess was only 40 miles, which can be traveled in 
less than one hour and is not unusual for California automobile commuters. None of 
the heart-wrenching issues of a cross-country 'move-away' were present in Burgess." 
Id. at 15. 
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Burgess precludes full consideration of other factors that may 
be the strongest indicators of the children's best interest.92 
A. RESEARCH UPON WHICH THE PRESUMPTION IN BURGESS IS 
BASED 
The Burgess court appeared to rely substantially on two of 
the four submitted amicus briefs.93 Both amicus briefs argued 
that stability and continuity in the custodial relationship are 
determinative factors in the children's post-dissolution psy-
chological adjustment.94 The briefs cited studies indicating 
that children's best interests are served by maintaining the 
continuity of established parent-child relationships.95 As such, 
the briefs asserted that children generally suffer greater harm 
when a custody modification results in reduced contact with 
the custodial parent than with the noncustodial parent.96 The 
briefs also emphasized supporting a divorced parent's desire to 
92. In Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996), Justice Titone wrote: 
In reality, cases in which a custodial parent's desire to relocate conflicts 
with the desire of a noncustodial parent to maximize visitation oppor-
tunity are simply too complex to be satisfactorily handled with any me-
chanical, tiered analysis that prevents or interferes with a simultane-
ous weighing and comparative analysis of all of the relevant facts and 
circumstances. 
Id. at 150. 
93. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 483. One of the amicus briefs upon which the Bur-
gess court heavily relied was the Arnica Curiae Brief of Judith S. Wallerstein. The 
other was the Amica Curiae Brief of Scott Altman, Janet Bowermaster, Carol S. Bruch, 
Jan C. Costello, Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Lisa C. Ikemoto, Janice E. Kosel, Frances 
Olsen, and Kelly Weisburg. The latter brief was submitted by Carol S. Bruch and 
Janet Bowermaster on behalf of a group of nine law professors. The briefs the Burgess 
court did not appear to rely upon were the Arnici Curiae Brief of Roberta M. Ikemi and 
Joan Zorza in support of respondent Wendy Burgess, and the Arnica Curiae Brief of 
Richard M. Bryan in support of appellant Paul D. Burgess. See id. 
94. See Amica Curiae Brief of Judith S. Wallerstein at 17, In re Marriage of Bur-
gess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996) (No. S046116). The Wallerstein argument also states 
that frequency and continuity of contact with the noncustodial parent is not nearly as 
significant a factor in the child's psychological development as the preservation of the 
custodial relationship. See id. 
95. See Arnica Curiae Brief of Judith S. Wallerstein at 13, 17, In re Marriage of 
Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996) (No. S046116), citing Joan B. Kelly & Judith S. 
Wallerstein, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the Child in Early Latency, 
46 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 20, 23 (1976). 
96. See Arnica Curiae Brief of Scott Altman, Janet Bowermaster, Carol S. Bruch, 
Jan C. Costello, Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Lisa C. Ikemoto, Janice E. Kosel, Frances 
Olsen, and Kelly Weisburg at 23-25, In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 
1996) (No. S046116). 
15
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build a new and separate life, which may involve a move to re-
marry, to pursue career opportunities, or to live near other 
family members.97 They argued that when relocation is likely 
to result in a substantially enhanced quality of life for a custo-
dial parent, often the children's best interests are indirectly but 
genuinely served.98 By following the recommendations in these 
amicus briefs, the Burgess court "[elevated] a parent's right to 
relocate above the children's need for frequent and continuing 
contact with both parents."99 
B. RESEARCH THAT THE BURGESS COURT DID NOT CONSIDER 
Practitioners have criticized the Burgess court for not con-
sidering contrary expert opinion.100 By giving primary weight 
to preserving the relationship between the children and the 
moving custodial parent, Burgess allows only a remote possi-
bility that in some divided families, other factors may outweigh 
the importance of preserving the children's relationship with 
97. See id. 
98. See id. See also Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434 (Pa. 1990). Other state courts 
also associate the custodial parent's desire to relocate with the children's best interests. 
In this recent Pennsylvania case, the custodial mother wished to relocate to another 
state for various reasons which included the absence of close friends and family where 
she was, and frequent heated arguments with her ex-husband in front of her three 
children. Also, her fmancial problems threatened her ability to support her children. 
The contemplated move from Pennsylvania to Illinois offered the mother an opportu-
nity to raise the children surrounded and supported by family and friends. See id. at 
435-36. The court emphasized that the well-being of children was more closely allied 
with the interests and quality of life of the custodial parent and therefore could not be 
determined without reference to those interests. See id. at 440-41. The court therefore 
permitted the mother to relocate with the children over the father's objections. Justice 
Beck wrote in his majority opinion: 
We think it is undisputable, under the circumstances of this case, that 
appellant's ability to be an effective parent to her children is seriously 
undermined by the difficulty and unhappiness of her life in Pennsylva-
nia. Conversely, there is no question that the move to Illinois is likely 
substantially to promote the well-being of the mother and, consequently 
make her a more effective, superior parent. We think it is fundamental 
that the best interests of the children cannot, in this case, be severed 
from the interests of the mother with whom they live and upon whose 
mental well-being they primarily depend. 
[d. at 441. 
99. See Bryan, supra note 91, at 15. 
100. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, supra note 90. E.g., Interview with Richard 
M. Bryan, Principal, Bryan, Hinshaw, Cohen & Barnet, in San Francisco, Cal. (Mar. 4, 
1998) (pointing out that the Burgess court did not follow his recommendations in the 
amicus brief he submitted.) 
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the custodial parent.101 The factors that the Burgess court ne-
glected to thoroughly evaluate include, among others: the na-
ture of the relationship that the children have with the noncus-
todial parent;102 the age of the children;103 the severity of con-
flict between the parents;104 and the distance and economic 
burden of the move.105 These factors could serve to compel a 
court to prohibit the relocation.106 Despite the reliance by Cali-
fornia courts on Burgess's reasoning,107 critics argue that judi-
cial decisions should not be based on a single threshold issue 
such as preserving the custodial relationship.108 Without a 
more flexible analysis, they argue, children's best interests may 
be sacrificed for judicial uniformity.109 Following is an exami-
nation of the factors that Burgess did not fully evaluate.110 
1. The Value of the Children's Relationships with Both 
Parents 
In California, two conflicting policies exist regarding the 
children's relationship with their divorced parents,111 These 
policies simultaneously emphasize the importance of the non-
101. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 478-79. See supra note 67 for Justice Mosk's state-
ment regarding continuity and stability in custody arrangements. 
102. See Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 151 (N.Y. 1996). 
103. See Dorene Marcus & Jeffrey I. GarfInkel, The Trial: Opposing Relocation, 20 
FAM. ADvoc. 41, 43 (1997). 
104. See Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 151. 
105. See Marcus & GarfInkel, supra note 103, at 43. 
106. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 483. The Burgess court conceded: 
Although the interests of a minor child in the continuity and perma-
nency of custodial placement with the primary caretaker will most often 
prevail, the trial court, in assessing ·prejudice" to the child's welfare as 
a result of relocating ... may take into consideration the nature of the 
child's existing contact with both parents ... and the child's age, com-
munity ties, and health and educational needs. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The Burgess court, however, stopped short of making consideration of these 
factors mandatory and of analyzing how much weight courts may assign to 
these factors. See id. 
107. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Wheal on, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1997). 
108. Telephone Interview with Sharon Lazaneo and Jackie Karkazis, Family Law 
Mediation and Evaluation Specialists, in Oakland, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997). 
109. Jeremy D. Dolnick, Article, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 1113, 1117-1118 (1997). 
110. See infra notes 111-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of those factors 
not fully evaluated by the Burgess court. . 
111. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text for identifIcation of these two 
conflicting policies. 
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custodial relationship while supporting the custodial parent's 
decision to move with the children.n2 The Burgess court ne-
glected to fully acknowledge the importance of the noncustodial 
relationship. 113 
Public policy inherent in California Family Code section 
3020 highly values the noncustodial relationship and empha-
sizes the quantity of time with the noncustodial parent as criti-
cal to the preservation of that relationship.114 Specifically, sec-
tion 3020 states that "it is the public policy of this state to as-
sure that children have frequent and continuing contact with 
both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved 
their marriage, or ended their relationship, and to encourage 
parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing 
"115 
At the same time, in cases in which a custodial parent is 
moving to remarry, public policy discourages forcing a parent 
to choose between her children and her new spouse, and there-
fore supports a custodial parent's move with the children.116 
This public policy is reflected in California Family Code section 
7501 which states that "[a] parent entitled to the custody of a 
child has a right to change the residence of the child .... "117 
California's conflicting public policies send mixed messages 
to family courts that struggle with the move-away issue.118 
However, the Burgess presumption, by valuing quality of time 
over quantity of time with the noncustodial parent, favors pre-
112. See infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of how these 
two public policies simultaneously influence move-away adjudications. 
113. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). In his dissent, Justice 
Baxter recognized this shortcoming by stating, "As our statutory law makes clear, 
California's public policy strongly favors the maximum contact between a minor child 
and 'both' of his separated parents." Id. at 486 (citation omitted). 
114. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 (West Supp. 1998). 
115. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020(b). 
116. See Arnica Curiae Brief of Scott Altman, Janet Bowermaster, Carol S. Bruch, 
Jan C. Costello, Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Lisa C. Ikemoto, Janice E. Kosel, Frances 
Olsen, and Kelly Weisburg at 17-23, In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 
1996) (No. S046116). 
117. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7501 (West 1994). 
118. Telephone Interview with Richard M. Bryan, Principal, Bryan, Hinshaw, 
Cohen & Barnet, in San Francisco, Cal. (Mar. 4, 1998). 
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serving the custodial relationship at the cost of weakening the 
noncustodial relationship.119 Unfortunately, this preference 
exists even when the noncustodial parent is as significant in 
the children's lives as the custodial parent by serving as a role 
model or providing abundant emotional support and nur-
turance.120 
As post-Burgess courts favor a move by the custodial mother 
over insuring continuity of contact with the noncustodial fa-
ther,121 the resulting loss of contact with the noncustodial fa-
ther adversely affects the children.122 In many cases, reduced 
visitation after a move-away results in the foregone opportu-
nity for future contact with a parent who may have been capa-
ble of providing love, support, and a link to the children's heri-
tage.123 That parent becomes a visitor in the children's lives, 
thereby weakening the parent-child bond that existed before 
the relocation.124 
Recently, child psychologists have emphasized the impor-
tance of both parents to the children's well-being,125 and legal 
experts have advocated strongly for the noncustodial father.126 
119. See Llrie S. Nachlis, Overview of Move-Away Law and Policy, 19 FAMILY LAw 
NEWS 2, 3 (1996). Burgess regards the relationship between the noncustodial parent 
and the child as relatively unimportant. See id. 
120. Telephone Interview with Sharon Lazaneo and Jackie Karkazis, Family Law 
Mediation and Evaluation Specialists, in Oakland, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997). 
121. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Whealon, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 563-64 (Ct. App. 
1997). 
122. See Paul R. Amato, Life.Span Adjustment of Children to Their Parents' Di· 
vorce, 4 THE FuTuRE OF CHILDREN 143, 150 (1994) (discussing the repercussions of 
parental absence). 
123. See id. 
124. See Robert Stephan Cohen & Pamela Sicher, 'Tropea' and 'Browner': The 
Missing Evidence, 216 N.Y. L.J. 25, S5 (1996). 
125. See Amato, supra note 122, at 153. 
126. Telephone Interview with Sharon Lazaneo and Jackie Karkazis, Family Law 
Mediation and Evaluation Specialists, in Oakland, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997). See ELEANOR 
E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DMDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL 
DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 286 (Harvard University Press 1992). The authors stress that: 
children who primarily reside with their mother can nevertheless re-
ceive a variety of benefits-psychological, social, and economic-from a 
continuing relationship with their father .... [Tlhe relationship with 
the father ... can provide emotional support in times of crisis and pos-
sible guidance for the child over the years. A father who has remained 
in contact is also more likely to provide substitute care should some-
19
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Such an emphasis has resulted in an increased interest by fa-
thers in joint custody; fathers appear to be more satisfied with 
an approximately equal time share than with a visitation 
schedule. 127 
Moreover, recent case law reflects this emphasis on the im-
portance of both parents.128 For example, in Cassady v. Si-
gnorelli,129 although the parents had a court order for joint 
physical custody, the daughter primarily resided with the 
mother, and the father enjoyed regular and frequent visitations 
with the daughter.130 When the mother proposed to move from 
California to Florida with the daughter, the father protested.131 
The court denied the mother's request to relocate with the 
child, holding that it was not in the child's best interest to 
move away from her father with whom she shared a close rela-
tionship.132 
thing happen to the custodial mother or to the child's relationship with 
the mother. 
ld. 
127. See Amato, supra note 122, at 153. 
128. See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of a case that 
exemplifies the recent judicial emphasis on the importance of both parents in the chil-
dren's lives. 
129. See Cassady v. Signorelli, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 545 (Ct. App. 1996). The Cassady 
court's ruling appears to misapply Burgess's reasoning. It focused on whether, accord-
ing to Burgess, the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the parties' cus-
tody arrangement was in the daughter's best interest. ld. at 546-47. The Cassady 
court prohibited the mother's relocation with the daughter primarily because it found 
that her job prospects in Florida were not realistic, and therefore not a strong enough 
reason to deny the daughter the continued close proximity to her father with whom she 
shared a good relationship. ld. at 547-49. The Cassady holding is not wholly consis-
tent with Burgess's primary holding - that a custodial parent is free to relocate with 
the child barring a vindictive motive. Specifically, in Cassady, Justice Peterson wrote: 
Contrary to mother's contentions, the trial court did not err by failing 
to give proper weight to the presumption that mother, as the primary 
physical caretaker, should be permitted to relocate unless relocation 
was not in Grace's best interests. (See Burgess, supra, 13 Cal. 4th at p. 
32, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 444, 913 P.2d 473.) Rather, the trial court properly 
exercised its great discretion to determine the best interests of Grace, 
and decided a relocation of her residence based only upon mother's 
somewhat whimsical plans and very uncertain prospects in Florida was 
not in Grace's best interests. (Ibid) 
ld. at 548. 
130. See id. at 547. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. at 545, 546. 
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2. The Children's Ages 
Just as the age of a child is an important consideration in 
determining the initial custody order, age should also be con-
sidered in custody modifications that result from the custodial 
parent's relocation.133 Although the Burgess court noted the 
significance of age in a footnote and in a brief acknowledgment 
of California Family Code section 3042, which mandates that 
courts consider the children's age in custody determinations,134 
it stopped short of qualifying it as a necessary factor to be con-
sidered in a move-away adjudication.135 
Typically, children under two years of age are more depend-
ent on the custodial parent, who is generally the mother.136 As 
children mature, however, their psychological growth and their 
diversified needs demand far broader parental roles and re-
sponsibilities from both parents.137 As both parents assume 
meaningful but different roles and relationships with their ma-
turing children, each parent may become a "primary parent" in 
separate ways.138 Often, children gradually regard each parent 
as a gender role model, and later, as a friend and advisor.139 
Therefore, when custody modifications involve children past 
infancy, more weight should be given to the value of main-
133. Interview with Lorie· S. Nachlis, supra note 90. 
134. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 483 (Cal. 1996). Justice Mosk 
cited California Family Code section 3042(a) which states that "[ilf a child is of suffi-
cient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to custody, 
the court shall consider and give due weight to the wishes of the child in making an 
order granting or modifying custody." Id. He also noted "that amica curiae Professor 
Judith S. Wallerstein ... observes that 'reasonably mature adolescents ... should be 
given the choice ... as to whether they wish to move with the moving parent.'" Id. at 
483 n.ll. 
135. See id. at 483. 
136. See Sandy W. Barnet & Richard M. Bryan, A Blueprint for a Move-Away Case 
Part II: The Non-Move-Away Parent, 18 FAM. L. NEWS 4,5 (1996) [hereinafter "Barnet 
& Bryan"l. Young children's dependency on the mother is especially strong if a mother 
is still nursing. See id. 
137. See Ross A. Thompson, The Role of the Father After Divorce, 4 THE FuTuRE OF 
CHILDREN 210, 217 (1994). 
138. See id. The "primary" parent is the parent who plays a more central caretak-
ing role in the children's lives. See id. 
139. Telephone Interview with Kimberly B. Hogan, Clinical Psychologist, in Ber-
keley, Cal. (Mar. 8,1998); see Thompson, supra note 137, at 219. 
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taining relationships with both parents rather than just the 
custodial parent.140 
Additionally, for older children, the importance of school, 
established friendships, and a familiar neighborhood, argue 
against a move-away,141 For example, in a 1986 California 
case, In re Marriage of Rosson, 142 the custodial mother wished 
to relocate with the children.143 The children, ages ten and 
thirteen, did not want to leave their familiar surroundings and 
expressed a clear wish to reside with their father who lived lo-
cally rather than move long-distance with their mother,144 De-
spite the mother's status as the children's "psychological" par-
ent,145 the court gave deference to the children's wishes and 
denied the mother's request to relocate with the children,146 
Thus, as Rosson demonstrates, a move away from a parent may 
have a more powerful adverse impact on children at one age or 
developmental stage than another.147 
Had this case been decided after Burgess,l48 however, the 
court may not have exercised the flexibility to consider these 
important factors, because of the Burgess court's emphasis on 
preserving the custodial relationship.149 Under a Burgess 
140. See Thompson, supra note 137, at 221. 
141. See Barnet & Bryan, supra note 136, at 6. 
142. See In re Marriage of Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Ct. App. 1986). 
143. See id. at 254. . 
144. See id. at 254-55. 
145. See Jennifer Klein Mangnall, Stepparent Custody Rights After Divorce, 26 Sw. 
U. L. REV. 399 (1997). A 'psychological parent' is "one who, on a continuing, day-to-day 
basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's 
psychological need for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs." Id. at 416 (quot-
ing JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 98 (The Free 
Press 1979) (1973». See also Jennifer E. Home, Note, The Brady Bunch and Other 
Fictions: How Courts Decide Child Custody Disputes Involving Remarried Parents, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 2073 (July 1993). The author recognizes that the psychological parent is 
the person to whom the children are most bonded. This parent "mayor may not be 
their primary caretaker, and ... judges should conduct psychological evaluations to 
determine how children feel about each parent." Id. at 2087. See also Guardianship of 
Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr. 781, 789 (Ct. App. 1983) (considering the role of a "psychologi-
cal parent" in a custody dispute between the child's biological parent and grandpar-
ents). 
146. See Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 259-260. 
147. See Marcus & GarfInkel, supra note 103, at 43. 
148. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). 
149. See id. at 478-79. 
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analysis, the Rosson court probably would have permitted the 
mother's relocation with the children, subordinating the chil· 
dren's best interests to the overriding concern with maintain· 
ing the custodial relationship.15o 
3. The Severity of Parental Conflict 
Another factor the Burgess court neglected to thoroughly 
account for is how the parents relate to each other.151 Joint 
physical custody or sole physical custody with liberal visitation 
are generally beneficial arrangements for children where di· 
vorced parents cooperate with each other.152 Their cooperative 
interaction contributes to the children's healthy development 
and peace of mind.153 Despite the growing frequency of fairly 
balanced custody arrangements, however, many parents do not 
cooperate with each other in sharing parenting responsibili· 
ties.154 Courts need to consider the type of custody that is best 
for children when parents maintain an antagonistic relation· 
ship with each other.155 
Legal experts proffer conflicting ideas about what type of 
custody arrangements are better for children in situations in· 
volving combative parents.156 Where parents with joint physi· 
150. Compare Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 256 (holding that, given the children's ages 
and maturity, their preference to remain in the community had to be given serious 
consideration by the court where the issue was whether the children should be moved 
from the place where they have lived for most of their lives, and where a devoted par-
ent remaining in the community wished to have the children reside with him), with 
Burgess, 913 P.2d at 478 (holding that the paramount need for continuity and stability 
in custody arrangements, and harm that may result from disrupting established pat-
terns of care and emotional bonds with the primary caretaker, weigh heavily in favor of 
permitting the custodial mother to relocate with the children). 
151. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, supra note 90. 
152. See Amato, supra note 122, at 154. 
153. See Judith S. Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psycho· 
logical and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 
FAM. L.Q. 305, 311 (1996) [hereinafter "Wallerstein & Tanke"). The authors add that 
without harmonic relations between the parents, the children's sense of security is 
threatened, and they may "view the world as an armed camp in which the child can 
trust no one." [d. 
154. See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., History and Current Status of Divorce in the 
United States, 4 THE FuTURE OF CHILDREN 29, 36 (1994). 
155. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, supra note 90. 
156. See infra notes 157·85 and accompanying text for discussion of desirable cus· 
tody arrangements when parents do not cooperate with each other. 
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cal custody maintain a state of severe parental discord, one 
pool of legal experts discourage co-parenting plans that require 
careful coordination between the parents of the children's so-
cial, academic, and extracurricular schedules.157 Similarly, 
where parents in conflict have an arrangement of sole physical 
custody with noncustodial parent visitation, these experts ad-
vise against frequent visits with the noncustodial parent.l58 
They reason that children do not benefit from being tossed into 
the tumultuous sea of resentment, anger, and discontent that 
flows too frequently from their parents' divorce.159 
Specifically, these legal experts argue that although a gen-
erous time share between hostile parents may preserve contact 
between the children and each parent, it may also exacerbate 
conflict between the parents.160 Such exacerbated conflict of-
ten leads to parental alienation which is harmful to the chil-
dren's psychological well-being.161 Parental alienation results 
when one parent, usually the custodial parent, deliberately at-
tempts to turn the children against the other parent, often by 
making disparaging comments about the other parent to the 
children. 162 Children may become emotionally troubled and 
157. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, supra note 90. See Amato, supra note 122, at 
154. See also Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 153, at 311. High conflict between 
divorced parents with shared custody "can severely threaten the child's sense of secu-
rity, confinning a view of the world as an anned camp in which the child can trust no 
one." Id. 
158. See Amato, supra note 122, at 150. See also Janet R. Johnston, High.Conflict 
Divorce, 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 165, 176 (1994) [hereinafter "Johnston"J. 
159. See Sondra Miller, Whatever Happened to the 'Best Interests' Analysis in New 
York Relocation Cases?, 15 PACE L. REV. 339, 388 (1995). 
160, See Riva Nelson, Parental Hostility, Conflict, and Communication in Joint and 
Sole Custody Families, 13 JOURNAL OF DIVORCE 145, 155-57 (1989). 
161. See Amato, supra note 122, at 154. See also Janet R. Johnston, Marsha Kline 
& Jeanne M. Tschann, Ongoing Post-Divorce Conflict: Effects on Children of Joint 
Custody and Frequent Access, 59 AM, J. OF ORTHOPSHYCHIATRY 576, 578 (1989) [here-
inafter "Johnston, Kline & Tschann"J. For example, the authors conducted a study 
involving 100 children (ages 1 to 12) of high conflict divorce. The parents in the study 
spoke disparagingly about the other parent to their children. Findings of the study 
revealed that young children who had more alternating time with these discordant 
parents were more emotionally and behaviorally disturbed. See id. Specifically, they 
were more depressed, withdrawn, and/or uncommunicative, had more somatic symp-
toms, and tended to be more aggressive. See id. at 581-88. 
162, See M. SUE TALIA, How TO AVOID THE DIVORCE FROM HELL 111·13 (Nexus 
Publishing Company) (1996) [hereinafter "TALIA"J. But see MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, 
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exhibit behavioral problems.163 Therefore, when parents are 
unable to cooperate, or when one parent is violent or abusive to 
the other parent, many experts recommend a sole custody ar-
rangement with minimal visitation.l64 
However, such a custody arrangement is not entirely benefi-
cial to children.165 The adverse effects of the judicial tendency 
to award sole physical custody in situations where parents con-
flict sharply include: reducing the custodial parent's motivation 
to cooperate with the noncustodial parent, further threatening 
the children's bond with the noncustodial parent, and increas-
ing litigation.166 To begin, where courts tend to award sole 
physical custody in situations of extreme parental conflict, par-
ents may use this judicial tendency to their advantage,167 Par-
ents recognize that once they have sole physical custody, courts 
generally will rely on the Burgess presumption favoring pres-
ervation of the custodial relationship and permit a move with 
the children.l68 As a result, a primary parent may choose not 
to work through conflict with the other parent since doing so 
could reduce the chances of being awarded sole physical cus-
tody.169 Courts, therefore, should be wary of the potential for 
supra note 126, at 275. "A mother's conviction that it is good for the children to sustain 
their relationship with their father is strongly associated with sustaining contact." Id. 
163. See Leslie Milk, Studies Say Relaxed Divorce Laws Have Hit Hardest at Kids, 
STAR-TRIB. OF MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL, Jan. 2, 1996, at OlE, citing Joan B. Kelly, Ex-
ecutive Director of the Northern California Mediation Center, Corte Madera, CA. 
Additionally, research on adolescents shows that when they feel caught between par-
ents, they too are more likely to exhibit depression and anxiety, and they often engage 
in "deviant behaviors" even years after their parents separate. See id. See also 
Johnston, Kline & Tschann, supra note 161, at 576. 
164. See Amato, supra note 122, at 154. An arrangement that involves minimal co-
ordination between intensely hostile parents protects the child from parental friction. 
See id. 
165. Interview with Tony J. Tanke, Partner, Tanke & Willemsen, LLP, in Palo Alto, 
Cal. (Aug. 24, 1997). 
166. See infra notes 167-76 and accompanying text for further discussion of these 
adverse effects. 
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the Burgess presumption to discourage parents in a custody 
dispute from trying to cooperate.170 
Courts should also consider that a hostile custodial parent 
often does little to facilitate the noncustodial relationship.l71 If 
a move-away under such circumstances is permitted, the added 
distance increases the risk that the children will lose their re-
lationship with the noncustodial parent entirely.172 For exam-
ple, the moving parent may be so blinded by ill feelings toward 
the other parent that she fails to support the children in 
working through their feelings of loss with regard to the non-
custodial parent.173 If left to manage such feelings of loss on 
their own, young children may reason the nonmoving parent 
must not be a good person.174 Additionally, this unsupportive 
behavior by the custodial parent can in turn motivate a resent-
ful noncustodial parent to appeal a custody modification.175 
Perpetual hostility and litigation between parents battling for 
custody in the face of a move can ultimately hurt the children, 
who are often used as pawns in their parents' power strug-
gle.176 
A separate school of legal experts encourages joint physical 
custody even when divorced parents are locked in conflict with 
each other.l77 These experts reason that parents who refuse to 
cooperate often have difficult personalities which may include 
traits of distrustfulness and a reduced ability to communi-
cate.178 Despite the conflict between the divorced parents, the 
children may benefit from a balanced time share because one 
parent's strengths can balance out the other's weaknesses.179 
170. Telephone Interview with Margaret Lee, Clinical Psychologist, in San Fran-
cisco, CA (Aug. 19, 1997). 
171. See id. 
172. See id. 
173. See id. When the moving parent neglects to help the children through their 
separation from the nonmoving parent, the impact of the loss is thus greater. [d. 
174. See id. 
175. Telephone Interview with Susan Talia, supra note 91. 
176. Telephone Interview with Margaret Lee, supra note 170. 
177. See id. See generally Johnston, Kline & Tschann, supra note 161, at 579 (de-
scribing personality shortcomings in parents who cannot settle their differences). 
178. Telephone Interview with Margaret Lee, supra note 170. 
179. [d. 
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Additionally, the balanced time share may be especially valu-
able for very young children, because they "have difficulty re-
membering an absent parent unless access occurs at more fre-
quent intervals. "180 
These legal experts further contend that where hostile par-
ents do not share joint physical custody, the children's need for 
a stable community environment is heightened.181 Thus, 
where hostile parents fail to protect the children from their 
own disturbed attitudes and behavior toward each other, the 
children's best interests may not be served by permitting the 
custodial parent to move with the children.182 A move in-
creases the disruption in the children's lives.l83 It therefore 
may be appropriate to give greater weight in these custody de-
cisions to providing the child with continuity in relationships 
and a stable environment.l84 Prohibiting the children's move 
enables them to continue receiving the support of teachers and 
peers, and to remain in their own neighborhood and school en-
vironments. l85 
4. The Distance of the Move-Away 
A move-away is not formally defmed by California's Family 
Code.l86 Further, courts have not established formal guide-
lines to manage the variability of distance in move-away 
cases.187 The Burgess court in particular did not specifically 
address the distance factor, thereby failing to distinguish a 
short-distance move from a long-distance move.l88 
180. Janet R Johnston, supra note 158, at 179. 
181. Interview with Bernard N. Wolf, Family Lawyer, Law Offices of Bernard N. 
Wolf, in San Francisco, Cal. (Jul. 21, 1997). 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. See Johnston, supra note 158, at 179. 
185. See id. 
186. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1 - 20043 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998). 
187. See Barnet & Bryan, supra note 136, at 3. 
188. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). Interview with Rich-
ard M. Bryan, Principal, Bryan, Hinshaw, Cohen & Barnet, in San Francisco, Cal. 
(Mar. 4, 1998). 
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a. Long-Distance Move-Aways 
Some legal experts emphasize the negative effects on the 
children of visitation schedules that change after a long-
distance move from frequent visits to occasional but longer vis-
its, such as summers and holidays.189 The farther away the 
move, the higher the degree of necessity for the move should be 
shown by the custodial parent to outweigh the reduction in 
contact between the children and the noncustodial parent.190 
For example, in a long-distance move, the custodial parent may 
"be required to show that the move is not merely preferable or 
convenient, but rather ... essential and imperative. "191 
Experts also assert that the noncustodial parent's fmancial 
ability to make regular long-distance visitation trips is another 
factor the court should weigh in determining whether to permit 
a relocation.192 When the moving parent is in a better financial 
position than the nonmoving parent, the court may permit the 
relocation and assign visitation costs to the moving parent.193 
Commonly, however, neither parent has the financial means to 
afford regular airline traveP94 Consequently, the high cost of 
\ 
189. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, supra note 90. 
190. See, e.g., Barnet & Bryan, supra note 136, at 3. 
191. Id. See also In re Marriage of Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App. 1991). In 
fact, California's earlier case law held that "in an appropriate situation, an increase in 
the distance between the child and the noncustodial parent will authorize an alteration 
in the tenns of custody or visitation." Id. at 844. 
192. See Bamet & Bryan, supra note 136, at 6. Interview with Richard M. Bryan, 
Principal, Bryan, Hinshaw, Cohen & Bamet, in San Francisco, Cal. (Mar. 4, 1998). 
The appellate court in Ruisi u. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766 (Ct. App. 1997), remanded 
the case for reconsideration of the mother's request to relocate with the child to Rhode 
Island. Mr. Bryan is currently representing the mother at retrial. In arguing in favor 
of granting the mother's request, he intends to emphasize that the father, who has 
extreme wealth and no job, could conceivably purchase a second home for himself 
wherever the child moves. See id. 
193. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 484. The Burgess court ruled that the trial court has 
broad discretion to modify orders concerning contact and visitation with the noncusto-
dial parent in the event of a move, "e.g., by ... allocating transportation expenses to 
the custodial parent, or requiring the custodial parent to provide transportation of the 
children to the noncustodial parent's home." Id. See also, e.g., In re Marriage of Rice, 
No. D94-00144 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 31, 1997). One additional measure to miti-
gate the hann to the child is court-ordered long-distance communication mechanisms 
to maintain contact, such as a specially dedicated facsimile machine, video 
conferencing system, or email account. See id. 
194. See Barnet & Bryan, supra note 136, at 6. 
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long-distance travel often inhibits frequent visitation, generally 
resulting in an eroded relationship between the noncustodial 
parent and the children.195 Arguably, prohibitive transporta-
tion costs could be used to establish detriment to the children if 
they preclude regular visits with the noncustodial parent, and 
thus justify denying a long-distance relocation.196 
b. Short-Distance Move-Aways 
In a short-distance move, however, such as that in Burgess, 
frequent and continuing contact may be maintained.197 Thus, 
a mere preference to move might be sufficient if no significant 
reduction of the other parent's time share would result.l98 For 
example, in In re Marriage of Selzer,199 the custodial mother 
requested to move the short distance within California from 
Ukiah to Santa Rosa to substantially reduce her one-hour 
commute to work.200 Although the court granted the mother's 
request to relocate with the daughter, it also increased the 
nonmoving father's visitation.201 Thus, frequent and continu-
ing contact was maintained despite the move.202 
C. CUSTODY ORDERS AFTER BURGESS 
When one parent attempts to prevent the children's reloca-
tion with the other parent, Burgess requires that there be a 
initial court order for joint physical custody and a balanced 
time share between the parents before the court may grant a 
de novo review of custody to determine anew what outcome 
195. See id. 
196. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Ber-
keley, Cal. (Dec. 19, 1997). Some family law judges, including Judge Duncun, view the 
loss of contact with a father over a long-distance barrier as a detriment warranting 
denial of a move-away. However, not all judges agree on this point. See id. 
197. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 479. The court determined that "[al1though it would 
be more convenient for the father to maintain a daily visitation routine with the chil-
dren if they remained in Tehachapi, he would still . . . be able to visit them regularly 
and often." Id. 
198. See Barnet & Bryan, supra note 136, at 3. 
199. See In re Marriage of Selzer, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824 (Ct. App. 1994). 
200. See id. at 824. . 
201. See id. at 825. See also Barnet & Bryan, supra note 136, at 3. 
202. See Selzer, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 825. 
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meets the children's best interests.203 As a result, courts since 
Burgess give heightened deference to the language of the initial 
court order and the daily calendars of each parent.204 Aware of 
this heightened deference, parents attach great significance to 
the custodial labeling process in the early stages of separa-
tion.205 
Since Burgess, more fathers campaign harder at the initial 
custody hearing for an award of court-ordered joint physical 
custody, hoping to avoid the risk of losing their children in a 
later move-away adjudication.206 Without a court-ordered label 
of "joint physical custody," Burgess dictates that the court may 
not grant a de novo review of custody.207 The noncustodial fa-
ther then carries the burden of demonstrating the change of 
circumstances required to modify custody or prevent a reloca-
tion.208 He must show that the move would result in detriment 
to the children.209 If the noncustodial father fails to meet this 
burden, the Burgess presumption favoring preservation of the 
custodial relationship typically prevails, inclining courts to 
grant the custodial mother's request to relocate with the chil-
dren.210 
203. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the require-
ments for a de novo custody review in move-away cases. 
204. Interview with Tony J. Tanke, supra note 165. 
205. See Bryan, supra note 91, at 16-17. 
206. Interview with Tony J. Tanke, supra note 165. See also Nancy Z. Berg & Gary 
A. Debele, Postdecree Custody Modification: Moving Out of State and Changes to the 
Parenting Relationship, 10 AM. J. OF FAM. L. 183, 191 (1996). Recent research also 
indicates that joint custody appears to be becoming more common. See id. 
207. Telephone Interview with Sharon Lazaneo and Jackie Karkazis, Family Law 
Mediation and Evaluation Specialists, in Oakland, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997). Ms. Karkazis 
observes through her mediation and evaluation work that parents are well aware of the 
Burgess decision, and they are rightly concerned about the impact of that decision on 
their own custody modification litigation. See id. 
208. See id. 
209. See supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of what consti-
tutes detriment. 
210. Telephone interview with Mary McNeal, Family Lawyer, Law Offices of Mary 
McNeal, in Berkeley, Cal. (July 14, 1997). Ms. McNeal criticizes the Burgess decision 
for its overly heavy reliance on court-issued custody labels. She opines that these la-
bels result in unfairness to noncustodial fathers who play an important role in their 
children's lives regardless of the label, and who do not want to lose their children to a 
long-distance move with the mother. See id. See infra notes 264-85 and accompanying 
text for further discussion of custody labels. 
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Parents' struggle to fit Burgess's joint physical custody defi-
nition211 creates problems that are particularly detrimental to 
children, such as increasing litigation and hostility between the 
parents.212 Often, attorneys and mediators spend considerable 
time counseling clients about how to draft the initial custodial 
agreement so that it meets the defmitional requirements es-
tablished by Burgess for a de novo review in move-aways.213 In 
the process, attorneys can easily lose sight of the ultimate issue 
of children's best interests by focusing on the labels more than 
the custody arrangement that best meets the children's 
needs.214 Additionally, these legal procedures are costly, and 
211. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 483 n.12 (Cal. 1996). The Bur-
gess court defmed "joint physical custody" to mean sharing physical custody as man-
dated by court order and maintaining a roughly equal time share arrangement with 
the children. See id. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text for a complete 
discussion of Burgess's "joint physical custody." 
212. See infra notes 213-23 and accompanying text for further discussion of the det-
rimental effects to children of parents' struggle to fit Burgess's "joint physical custody" 
defmition. 
213. Telephone Interview with Sharon Lazaneo and Jackie Karkazis, Family Law 
Mediation and Evaluation Specialists, in Oakland, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997). See also Lin-
wood R. Slayton, Jr., Custody, Visitation, Divorce: Factors to Consider When Represent-
ing the Father, NAT'L BAR Ass'N MAGAZINE, July/Aug. 1996, at 16. Mr. Slayton re-
minds that M(a]ttorneys have an afiIrmative duty to zealously advocate on behalf of the 
client but they also have a duty to ensure that the children ... suffer as little as possi-
ble as the process unfolds and ultimately comes to a conclusion." Id. 
214. See generally Richard Updegrove, Jr. & Roberta L. Thompson, The Double-
Edged Sword of Child Relocations: Successful Representation of the Parents, 45 R.I. 
B.J. 11, 13 (1997) (outlining how the Tropea and Burgess decisions might effect client 
representation in Rhode Island). See also JANET R. JOHNSTON & VMENNE RoSEBY, IN 
THE NAME OF THE CHILD: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AND 
HELPING CHILDREN OF CONFLICTED AND VIOLENT DIVORCE 224 (The Free Press 
1997). The authors urge that: 
family law attorneys' primary role is not to strategically maneuver the 
presentation of evidence and evoke statutes and case law to win their 
client's case-as if their clients were indifferent to the effects of a legal 
victory on the lives of their children and as if the need for an ongoing 
working relationship with the other spouse/parent were irrelevant .... 
[T)he family attorney's role includes counseling clients fully on their 
rights and responsibilities as parents and co-parents, and exploring 
deeply the ramifications of all the clients' actions not only on the cli-
ents' welfare but on the welfare of the children as well. The attorney 
can then responsibly and ethically advocate for their clients' more . 
clearly defined interests. 
Id. 
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often generate ill-will between the parents, which ultimately 
hurts the children.215 
Focusing chiefly on the labels can cause further problems 
when one parent petitions to modify custody in a move-away 
adjudication.216 Court-issued labels often do not accurately 
describe the custody arrangement that the parents actually 
share.217 Specifically, while parents may have a court order for 
joint physical custody, the time share that the parents exercise 
and the relationships between the children and their parents 
may reflect a more unbalanced custodial arrangement.218 Nev-
ertheless, in a move-away case, post-Burgess courts generally 
determine the standard of review based on the language of the 
initial custody order.219 Thus, Burgess has the unfortunate 
effect of shifting the emphasis away from consideration of the 
actual relationships the children have with each parent in fa-
vor of the custody labe1.22o 
Another significant problem with relying on the joint physi-
cal custody label is that as parents amplify their concern about 
the percentage of time the children are with them, their inter-
est in timekeeping begins to loom larger than their interest in 
the children's needs.221 The children's lives often are seriously 
disrupted by their constant shuttle between their parents' 
separate homes.222 Consequently, the benefits to children of 
joint physical custody can easily be clouded by the ongoing 
215. See generally Bryan, supra note 91 (discussing the implications of the Burgess 
decision). 
216. See infra notes 264-69 and accompanying text for further discussion of the 
problems labels cause in move-away adjudications. 
217. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Ber-
keley, Cal. (Oct. 10,1997). 
218. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text for a distinction between court-
ordered joint physical custody and the actual custodial arrangement. 
219. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Ber-
keley, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997). 
220. See id.; Interview with Kristi Cotton-Spence, Family Lawyer, Berra-Spence, 
in San Mateo, Cal. (Aug. 21, 1997). Noncustodial fathers who attempt to prove that a 
move will result in detriment to the children will often hire a psychological evaluator to 
scrutinize the children's relationships with each parent and then testifY in court about 
those relationships. Placing the children under intense observation can be especially 
unsettling for children. See id. 
221. See TALlA, supra note 162, at 104. 
222. See id. 
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hardship of bouncing between parents who insist on main-
taining an inflexible timeshare schedule.223 
IV. CRITIQUE AND PROPOSAL 
Since Burgess, the presumption favoring continuity of the 
custodial relationship induces courts to strive to keep the cus-
todial relationship intact, thereby helping custodial parents 
gain judicial permission to relocate with their children.224 
Without the relative ease of gaining judicial permission, these 
parents, who are generally the mothers, would face a greater 
risk of being forced to choose between relocating and keeping 
their children.225 An unfortunate effect of the Burgess decision 
is the noncustodial father's increased risk of becoming the long-
distance parent who seldom sees his children.226 As a result, a 
tension has developed between "the effect of changing the 
child's contact with the non-custodial parent and the often 
positive reasons for the custodial parent's desire to relocate."227 
Mounting concern about the effect of Burgess on fathers' loss of 
contact with their children suggests that California should 
modify its move-away law.228 Specifically, California should 
223. Interview with Kristi Cotton-Spence, supra note 220. 
224. See Richard M. Bryan, Beyond Burgess: One Year Later, 20 FAM. ADvOC. 14 
(1997) !hereinafter "Bryan"). "Burgess eases the ability of a custodial parent to move 
freely." Id. 
225. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1993). In this 
pre-Burgess case, the mother had to show that the move was in the children's best 
interests before the court would allow her to relocate with them. See id. 
226. See Jeff Woods, Singer Joins Dads Fighting Custody Laws, NASHVILLE 
BANNER, Apr. 7, 1997, at AI. The Burgess decision parallels the Tennessee Supreme 
Court's holding in Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. 1996), discussed infra. 
Tennessee singer Radney Foster laments the effect of Tennessee's move-away law in 
the words of his song, 5,000 Miles: "Cause it don't matter how much you love them, or 
if you've acted faithfully. They can take away your precious children. Five thousand 
miles from Tennessee." Id. 
227. See Richard Updegrove, Jr. & Roberta L. Thompson, The Double-Edged Sword 
of Child Relocations: Successful Representation of the Parents, 45 R.I. B.J. 11 (1997). 
228. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Ber-
keley, Cal. (Dec. 19, 1997). Judge Duncun describes the "fathers' movement" as or-
ganized groups comprised primarily of fathers who voice criticism of California's cur-
rent move-away law and advocate for statutory modifications. One group, the Coali-
tion of Parent Support, publishes a widely circulating newsletter and has chapters 
throughout the state. See id. See also Monroe L. Inker & Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., 
Can Custodial Parents Dictate a Child's Home?, MAss. L. WKLY, Feb. 24, 1997, at 11. 
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discard its presumptions and instead apply a "best interest of 
the child" analysis, as employed in other jurisdictions.229 Cali-
fornia should also develop additional child custody labels that 
more accurately describe the custody arrangements that par-
ents maintain.23o 
A. GUIDANCE FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS' MOVE-AWAY LAws 
Throughout the United States and internationally, applica-
ble standards to determine when a custodial parent may relo-
cate over the objection of the noncustodial parent remain dis-
parate.231 Several jurisdictions' move-away laws may offer 
guidance to the California legislature.232 
Despite the prevalence of presumptions favoring custodial 
parent relocation in the 1990s, some jurisdictions are indicat-
ing a renewed preference for the "best interest" analysis over 
the "change of circumstances" test.233 California should also 
re-adopt the "best interest" analysis in move-aways to insure 
the best possible outcome for the children.234 
Jurisdictions using a "best interest" standard reject deciding 
relocation cases by using presumptions that skew the analy-
sis.235 They reason that such a mechanical application of legal 
The belief that children benefit from regular contact with both parents continues to run 
strong in our society and parental rights continue to fmd many supporters. Id. 
229. See infra notes 235-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "best in-
terest" standard used by other jurisdictions. 
230. See infra notes 270-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of proposed cus-
tody labels. 
231. See Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A2d 434, 437 (Pa. 1990). 
232. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Ber-
keley, Cal. (Dec. 19, 1997). 
233. See Nancy Z. Berg & Gary A Debele, Postdecree Custody Modification: Moving 
Out of State and Changes to the Parenting Relationship, 10 AM. J. OF FAM. L. 183, 189 
(1996). See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text for a description of the "best 
interest" analysis. See supra notes 67-88 and accompanying text for a description of 
the "change of circumstances" test. 
234. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1993) (applying 
the "best interest" standard more freely before the Burgess decision). 
235. See, e.g., Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 151 (N.Y. 1996). In the Tropea 
opinion, Justice Titone wrote, "[I]t serves neither the interests of the children nor the 
ends of justice to view relocation cases through the prisms of presumptions and thresh-
old tests that artificially skew the analysis in favor of one outcome or another." Id. 
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doctrine is not in the best interest of children or the pursuit of 
justice.236 Instead, these jurisdictions weigh a wider range of 
factors, such as the quality of the children's relationship with 
the noncustodial parent and the children's ages.237 
A recent New York case, Tropea v. Tropea,238 exemplifies 
this broader analysis in its application of the "best interest" 
analysis.239 In Tropea, the custodial mother desired to move 
long-distance to join her fiance and raise her sons in the new 
family unit, thereby effectively eliminating the noncustodial 
father's regular midweek visits.24o The New York Court of Ap-
peal found no single factor dispositive on the issue of whether 
to permit the relocation.241 Instead, the court considered many 
factors such as the psychological impact on the children if the 
custodial mother's goals were thwarted, the impact on the rela-
tionship between the children and the noncustodial parent, and 
both parties' economic circumstances.242 The court ultimately 
affirmed the district court's decision to permit the relocation, 
finding that the move was in the children's best interest.243 
236. See id. 
237. See id. Justice Titone wrote: 
These factors include, but are certainly not limited to each parent's rea-
sons for seeking or opposing the move, the quality of the relationship 
between the child and the custodial and the noncustodial parents, the 
impact of the move on the quality and quantity of the child's future con-
tact with the noncustodial parent, the degree to which the custodial 
parent's and child's life may be enhanced economically, emotionally and 
educationally by the move, and the feasibility of preserving the rela-
tionship between the noncustodial parent and child through suitable 
visitation arrangements. 
[d. 
238. See Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996). 
239. See id. Justice Titone wrote, "In the end, it is for the court to determine, based 
on all of the proof, whether it has been established by a preponderance of the evidence 
that a proposed relocation would serve the child's best interests." [d. at 151-52. 
240. See id. at 146. 
241. See id. at 150-51 (discussing the various factors weighed in the decision of 
whether or not to permit the relocation, but not concluding that a particular single 
factor was ultimately determinative). 
242. See id. 
243. See Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 152. See also Robert Stephan Cohen & Pamela Si-
cher, 'Tropea' and 'Browner: The Missing Evidence, 216 N.Y. L.J. 25, S5 (1996). Nev-
ertheless, the Tropea court is criticized for denying the father "the opportunity to es-
tablish, with psychological evidence and expert testimony from a forensic mental 
health professional, whether the proposed relocation was proper under the new 'best 
interest' standard." [d. 
35
Gould: California's Move-Away Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1998
562 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vo1.28:527 
Further, in Aaby v. Strange,244 the custodial mother re-
quested the court's permission to move out-of-state with her 
minor son, against the father's wishes.245 As in Burgess, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court recognized a presumptive right of 
the custodial parent to relocate with the child wherever she 
wishes to move.246 The court held that the custodial mother 
was allowed to remove the minor child to Kentucky notwith-
standing the father's objection that the move interfered with 
the noncustodial parent's access to the child.247 It further held 
that the relocation was impermissible only if the noncustodial 
parent proved the motive for moving was vindictiveness to-
wards that parent.248 
Justice White's dissent criticized the majority for placing a 
high degree of importance on the custodial parent's unre-
stricted freedom to relocate.249 He stated that the law should 
require a custodial parent who desires to relocate to first dem-
onstrate that the move would not harm "the child's social, edu-
cational, psychological and health needs.''250 Presently, a bill 
before the Tennessee legislature addresses the issues raised in 
White's dissent.251 The bill proposes returning to the "best in-
244. See Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. 1996). 
245. See id. at 624. 
246. See id. at 629. See also Inker & Kindregan, supra note 228, at 11. 
247. See Aaby, 924 S.W.2d at 629. See also Inker & Kindregan, supra note 228, at 
11. 
248. See Aaby, 924 S.W.2d at 629. 
249. See id. at 631 (White, J., dissenting). 
250. [d. 
251. See Woods, supra note 226, at AI; S. 1235, 100th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess., § 1 
(Tenn. 1998). The bill states, in pertinent part: 
(c) If the non-custodial parent does petition the court for a hearing, the 
court shall conduct one as soon as possible after notifying the parties. 
The court, in its discretion, may appoint a guardian ad litem to repre-
sent the interests of the child or children if the court does not believe 
they will be adequately represented by the parties. The sole issue at 
the hearing shall be whether the proposed move of the child or children 
out-of-state is in the best interests of such child or children. The custo-
dial parent, the non-custodial parent and the guardian ad litem, if one 
is appointed, may offer proof on the issue. 
(d) If the court determines that moving the child or children out-of-state 
is in their best interest, it shall issue an order authorizing the move. If 
the court determines that it is not in their best interest, it may issue an 
order prohibiting the move or it may modify or change its original 
award of custody. 
[d. 
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terest" standard in move-away cases involving an out-of-state 
relocation,252 and requiring the moving parent to prove that 
the move is in the children's best interest.253 California should 
enact a similar bill because it already has provided for wide 
discretion in the code and case law has supported placing a cer-
tain burden on the moving parent.254 
Moreover, a recent decision in the Court of Appeal of the 
United Kingdom ruled that a mother who had temporary cus-
tody should not normally be allowed to remove a child from 
Colorado to England without the father's consent.255 In dic-
tum, the court discussed the rights of noncustodial parent in 
relocation cases.256 Specifically, the court stated that because 
both parents have the right of custody, one mother's unilateral 
removal of the child is wrong because it precludes the father's 
exercise of his right.257 
In taking guidance from the move-away laws of other juris-
dictions, California should abandon its presumptions in favor of 
252. See S. 1235, 100th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess., § 1 (Tenn. 1998). This bill not 
only changes the burden of proof in Tennessee's move-away cases, but also establishes 
that the minimum distance requirement is a move out of the state. See id. California 
has not yet formally defined the distance required for qualification as a move-away. 
See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text for further discussion of the absence of 
distance perimeters in California's move-away law. 
253. See Woods, supra note 226, at AI. The bill is recommended by a special legis-
lative committee that studied child custody issues at length. See id. 
254. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(b) (West 1994) (giving the court the "widest discre-
tion" in choosing a parenting plan that is in the child's best interest). See also In re 
Marriage of Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295 (Ct. App. 1993). In Roe, a pre-Burgess case, the 
court held that the moving parent does in fact bear a burden of proof, but it is the bur-
den to show that the move is not only necessary to the custodial parent but also is in 
the best interest of the child. See id. See also In re Marriage of Selzer, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
824 (Ct. App. 1994). Subsequently, the court in Selzer cited to Roe and observed that 
"this standard, derived from the present language of § 3040(b) ... properly harmonizes 
and strikes a balance between the rights of the custodial parent, the noncustodial par-
ent, and the child." Id. at 828. 
255. See In re F (A Minor), (1995) 3 W.L.R. 339. 
256. See Inker & Kindregan, supra note 228, at II. 
257. See In re F (A Minor), (1995) 3 W.L.R. 339. Judge Butler-Sloss wrote: 
I am satisfied that the mother and father both enjoyed equal and sepa-
rate rights of custody by Colorado law .... The removal of the child by 
the mother [therefore) interfered with the rights of the father in that he 
was prevented from actually exercising them in the U.S.A .... In so 
doing, she was in my judgment in breach of the father's rights ... and 
the removal was wrongful. 
Id. at 344. 
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a proposed move by a custodial parent.258 Courts could then 
exercise greater discretion and flexibility to decide cases where 
the noncustodial parent is genuinely opposed to the move.259 A 
move will be allowed, or disallowed, because one of the parties 
has demonstrated that it is, or is not, in the children's best in-
terest.260 As Justice Baxter noted in his Burgess dissent,261 
when the California legislature adopted the Family Law Act in 
1969, it specified that custody disputes must be decided solely 
on the basis of the children's best interests.262 California case 
law must not contravene that mandate.263 
B. THE NEED FOR MORE ACCURATE CUSTODY LABELS 
The Burgess opinion recognizes only two formal classifica-
tions of physical custody: ''joint physical custody" and "sole 
physical custody with visitation rights."264 To noncustodial 
fathers who are significantly involved in parenting despite not 
having joint physical custody, the "sole physical custody" label 
is offensive.265 Noncustodial fathers understand that when a 
mother is granted "sole physical custody," post-Burgess courts 
may regard the mother has having full custodial responsibility 
258. Cf. Sondra Miller, Whatever Happened to the 'Best Interests' Analysis in New 
York Relocation Cases?, 15 PACE L. REV. 339, 385 (1995) (proposing that New York 
should abandon an "exceptional circumstances" test and adopt a "best interest" test, 
with the burden on the custodial parent to show that the move satisfies the "best inter-
est" test criteria). 
259. Cf, id. at 385-86 (proposing a four-part analysis that would require the court to 
consider all relevant factors before a move is permitted). 
260. See id. at 386 (urging abandonment of presumptions against relocation and 
the required showing of threshold exceptional circumstances, and instead permitting a 
move only if the children's best interests will be served). 
261. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 484-86 (Cal. 1996) (Baxter, J. dis-
senting). 
262. See id. at 485. 
263. Cf, Judge Donald R. Ash, Bridge Over Troubled Water: Changing the Custody 
Law in Tennessee, 27 U. MEM L. REV. 769 (1997) (emphasizing that Tennessee's man-
date cannot be contravened). Judge Ash cautions that the "best interest" standard can 
allow too much judicial discretion. He states that "the lawyer's victory may very much 
depend on the accurate perception and manipulation of the court's leanings, or upon 
creating them. The court must do a better job in its application of [the best interest) 
standard." Id. at 804. 
264. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Ber-
keley, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997). 
265. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Ber-
keley, Cal. (Dec. 19, 1997). Courts can quite casually assign the designation of "sole 
physical custody" without realizing its possible implications. See id. 
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for the children, and attach minimal custodial value to the fa-
ther's parenting involvement, regardless of the frequency and 
quality of his visitations.266 The court may then simply rely on 
the Burgess presumption favoring preservation of the custodial 
relationship and permit the mother's move.267 The term "sole 
physical custody" also disparages the significance of the role of 
the father in the child's emotional or psychological develop-
ment268 by relegating him to the outside parent with "visitation 
rights" only.269 
The California legislature should institute "primary physi-
cal custody" and "secondary physical custody" labels to more 
appropriately identify many parenting plans and to offer fa-
thers without joint physical custody greater recognition of their 
parenting roles.27o The "primary custodial parent" designates 
that parent in whose physical custody the children remain 
most of the time, and who, therefore, has more responsibility 
over the children.271 The "secondary custodial parent" has the 
children for less than half time but still plays a vital role in the 
children's lives.272 Although some courts currently assign joint 
physical custody with "primary physical custody" to one parent 
to assure that parent that she will have more custodial time 
with the children,273 the "primary physical custody" designa-
266. Interview with Lorie S. Nachlis, Family Lawyer, Nachlis & Fink, in San Fran-
cisco, Cal. (Jul. 8, 1997). 
267. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). See supra note 67 
and accompanying text for a description of the Burgess presumption. 
268. See Miller, supra note 258, at 387. 
269. Interview with Kristi Cotton-Spence, Family Lawyer, Berra-Spence, in San 
Mateo, Cal. (Aug. 21, 1997). See also Arnica Curiae Brief of Richard M. Bryan, In re 
Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996) (No. S046116). Mr. Bryan writes that 
"[t)imesharing percentages and loose terminology have no place in weighing real life 
considerations to children going through a move-away experience. What is really im-
portant is the quality, intensity, and bonding of the child's relationship with each of its 
parents." Id. at 24. 
270. Interview with Kristi Cotton-Spence, supra note 269. 
271. See Brody v. Kroll, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1996). See also Ruisi v. 
Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 770 (Ct. App. 1997) (demonstrating that the "primary 
caretaker" is not necessarily the parent in whose custody the children remain all of the 
time, but rather, in whose custody and care the children remain most of the time). 
272. Interview with Bernard N. Wolf, Family Lawyer, Law Offices of Bernard N. 
Wolf, in San Francisco, Cal. (Aug. 20, 1997). 
273. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Ber-
keley, Cal. (Oct. 10, 19~7). See also Ruisi, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 770. 
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tion is merely "window dressing," and cannot be enforced be-
cause it is not defined in the California Family Code or for-
mally recognized by the courts.274 Moreover, it does not consti-
tute an official custody designation for the purpose of trigger-
ing a standard of review in move-away cases.275 
The "primary" and "secondary" physical custody designa-
tions are beneficial to parents and children in several ways.276 
First, they are more honest descriptors than "sole custodial 
parent" and "noncustodial parent with visitation rights" in 
many situations where the father assumes significant parent-
ing responsibilities.277 A "secondary custodial parent" label 
validates the parenting role and describes dedicated parental 
involvement, whereas "visiting rights" suggests that the non-
custodial parent is merely a visitor in the children's lives.278 
This nomenclature also emphasizes to parents that custody 
orders are not "joint or nothing" propositions.279 This under-
standing encourages a cooperative attitude between the par-
ents, and helps them recognize the children's need to maintain 
a close, continuing relationship with each parent.280 Greater 
274. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Ber-
keley, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997). 
275. See Brody, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282. 
276. See infra notes 277-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the positive 
effects of the "primary" and "secondary" custody designations. 
277. Interview with Kristi Cotton-Spence, supra note 269. 
278. C{. Ash, supra note 263, at 801 (advocating replacing terms such as "custody" 
and "visitation" with terms that do not convey ownership of the child or only a periph-
eral involvement by the noncustodial parent). 
279. Interview with Kristi Cotton-Spence, supra note 269. Ms. Cotton-Spence notes 
that the words "sole" and "visitation" sound threatening to many parents and therefore 
tend to produce litigation. See id. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKlN, 
DMDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 279 (Harvard Univer-
sity Press 1992). The authors suggest that the labels courts use in the custody order 
influence co-parental relations and patterns of parenting. They write, "We suspect ... 
that the reforms enacted by California divorce law, explicitly authorizing joint custody 
and encouraging frequent and continuing contact with both parents, have had some-
thing to do with our rmding of relatively high frequencies of joint physical custody 
awards and sustained visitation." ld. 
280. C{. Ash, supra note 263, at 806 (proposing goals for establishing parenting 
agreements that include removal of legal jargon, and recognizing the benefit of main-
taining a close relationship with both parents). 
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cooperation between parents thereby reduces custody modifica-
tion litigation.281 
Additionally, loose definitions of "primary" and "secondary" 
physical custody afford parents the opportunity to settle into 
their own best pattern of shared custody.282 In contrast, if or-
dered by the court to follow the rigid custody schedules associ-
ated with "joint physical custody" or "sole physical custody with 
visitation rights," parents may exercise a co-parenting routine 
that is uncomfortable for them and the children.283 Perhaps 
most importantly, the new labels may incline courts to regard 
co-parenting plans differently.284 The labels may signal courts 
to attach greater weight in the custody evaluation to the fa-
ther's role and give courts more flexibility to consider the im-
portance to the children ofthe father's role in their lives.285 
v. CONCLUSION 
In re Marriage of Burgess and subsequent California courts 
emphasize the distinction between joint physical custody and 
sole custody with noncustodial parent visitation in move-away 
cases.286 Although largely ignored by the courts, abundant so-
cial science research and expert legal opinion discourage joint 
and sole physical custody designations because they preclude a 
thorough evaluation of the actual relationships between the 
281. See Miller, supra note 258, at 388. 
282. Interview with Kristi Cotton-Spence, supra note 269. 
283. Id. 
284. Interview with Richard M. Bryan, Principal, Bryan, Hinshaw, Cohen & Bar-
net, in San Francisco, Cal. (Mar. 11, 1998). 
285. Interview with Judith H. B. Cohen, Family Lawyer, Law Offices of Judith H. 
B. Cohen, in Corte Madera, Cal. (Mar. 13, 1998). Ms. Cohen notes, however, that cer-
tain jurisdictions in California rely more on existing labels than others to interpret the 
relationships between the children and each parent. In particular, several courts in 
the San Francisco Bay Area have demonstrated a reluctance to rigidly follow Burgess's 
'joint" and "sole" custody distinction, looking beneath the labels to understand the 
child-parent relationships. See id. 
286. See, e.g., Ruisi v. Thieriot, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766 (1997); In re Marriage of 
Whealon, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559 (Ct. App. 1997); In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 
(Cal. 1996). 
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children and each parent.287 Studies show and various cases 
illustrate that the quality of the noncustodial parent's relation-
ship with the children is not necessarily a function of the dura-
tion or frequency of visits288 or of the court-ordered label for 
that relationship.289 Many legal professionals and psycholo-
gists point out that the substance and character of the parent-
child relationship, and not the particular form, is often most 
critical in deciding a custody modification proceeding.29o 
Furthermore, Burgess provides little guidance for the ma-
jority of move-away cases.291 This is due to the relatively sim-
ple facts and short-distance move contemplated in that case.292 
For these reasons, the Burgess presumptions should not be me-
chanically applied to cases with significantly different facts and 
varying shared custody arrangements.293 Presumptions only 
simplify the complicated inquiries inherent in move-away 
cases.294 The courts must not lose sight of the child's best in-
terests in an effort to promote judicial economy and uniform-
ity.295 
287. See, e.g., Richard M. Bryan, Beyond Burgess: One Year Later, 20 FAM. ADvoc. 
14, 16 (1997). California's statutory defmitions of "joint" and "sole" physical custody 
are imprecise and deceptive. See id. 
288. See Michele A. Katz, Tropea v. Tropea, Tropea and its Recent Aftermath: ReLo· 
cation Cases Decided After Tropea, 177 PLIICRIM 59, 63 (1997). See also Sondra Miller, 
Whatever Happened to the 'Best Interests' Analysis in New York Relocation Cases?, 15 
PACE L. REV. 339, 366 (1995). 
289. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Ber-
keley, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997). 
290. See, e.g., Janet R. Johnston, Children's Adjustment in Sole Compared to Joint 
Custody Families and Principles for Custody Decision Making, 33 FAM. & CON· 
CILIATION CTS. REV. 415, 419 (1995). 
291. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Ber-
keley, Cal. (Dec. 19, 1997). 
292. Id. Burgess involved a move of only 40 miles, but most move-aways involve a 
moving of a distance of far greater than 40 miles. See id. Telephone Interview with 
Sharon Lazaneo and Jackie Karkazis, Family Law Mediation and Evaluation Special-
ists, in Oakland, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1997). Of the many move-away cases that Sharon 
Lazaneo and Jackie Karkazis have mediated, no two cases have been factually alike. 
See id. 
293. Interview with Tony J. Tanke, Partner, Tanke & Willemsen, LLP, in Palo Alto, 
Cal. (Aug. 24, 1997). 
294. See Katz, supra note 288, at 63. 
295. See Richard Updegrove, Jr. & Roberta L. Thompson, The DoubLe-Edged Sword 
of Child Relocations: Successful Representation of the Parents, 45 R.I. B.J. 11 (1997). 
See also Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996). Justice Titone wrote, " ... given 
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Instead of a mechanical Burgess approach, California courts 
should use a more flexible definition of a change of circum-
stances in a move-away situation.296 Insofar as a change of 
circumstances must result in detriment to the children, this 
definition must be broadened to encompass consideration of the 
loss of proximity to the noncustodial parent who is significant 
in the children's lives.297 In protecting the custodial parent's 
freedom to make decisions about her own future and the future 
of the children, courts should not permit the imposition of an 
excessive handicap on the relationship between the children 
and the noncustodial parent.29B 
The resolution of move-away cases involves imperfect and 
often painful solutions,299 and applicable standards vary across 
jurisdictions.30o In addressing the shortcomings of the Burgess 
decision, California courts should look for guidance in the 
holdings in other jurisdictions301 that consider a wider range of 
factors which affect the well-being of children in divided fami-
lies.302 Additionally, California lawmakers should codify cus-
tody designations that more fairly characterize actual divided 
parenting situations instead of relying on narrow statutory 
the variety of possible pennutations, it is counterproductive to rely on presumptions 
whose only real value is to simplifY what are necessarily extremely complicated in-
quiries." Id. at 150. 
296. Interview with Bernard N. Wolf, Family Lawyer, Law Offices of Bernard N. 
Wolf, in San Francisco, Cal. (Jul. 21, 1997). 
297. Id. 
298. See Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A2d 434, 441 (Pa. 1990). 
299. Telephone Interview with Susan Talia, Family Lawyer, Law Offices of Susan 
Talia, in San Francisco, Cal. (Sept. 18, 1997). 
300. See Nancy Z. Berg & Gary A. Debele,Postdecree Custody Modification: Moving 
Out of State and Changes to the Parenting Relationship, 10 AM. J. OF FAM. L. 183, 184-
185 (1996). Compare In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996) (establishing 
a California presumption that the custodial parent may relocate with the child because 
preserving the custodial relationship is paramount), with Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 
145 (N.Y. 1996) (applying New York's 'best interest of the child' test that weighs mul-
tiple factors without any presumptions favoring the moving parent). 
301. See, e.g., Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996). The Tropea court held 
that" ... in all cases, the courts should be free to consider and give appropriate weight 
to all of the factors that may be relevant to the detennination." Id. at 15I. 
302. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 
CAL. L. REV. 615, 643 (1992). 
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definitions that fail to capture the nature of the relationships 
that parents share with their children.303 
It is impossible to devise a judicial formula for a divided 
custody arrangement that perfectly suits all, or even most, 
families.304 However, the more equipped California courts are 
to understand the ties that children have to each parent in 
move-away cases, the better the judicial outcomes will be for 
children.305 After all, children are innocent victims in divorce 
and are ill prepared to handle a changing family situation.306 
Therefore, the rights and needs of the children must be ac-
corded the greatest weight. 
Jennifer Gould* 
303. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Ber-
keley, Cal. (Dec. 19, 1997). By relying on old statutes that identify physical custody as 
either "joint" or "sole," the Burgess court made a decision that was legalistic in nature, 
not socialistic. See id. 
304. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DMDlNG THE CHILD: 
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 296. (Harvard University Press 1992). 
305. Interview with Roderic Duncan, Retired Judge of the Superior Court, in Ber-
keley, Cal. (Dec. 19, 1997). Judge Duncan cautions that attempting to actually charac-
terize the actual shared custody arrangement could result in an evidentiary battle 
between the parents. See id. 
306. See Katz, supra note 288, at 63. 
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